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TORT
THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
LAW OF TORT
Arthur Ripstein*
INTRODUCTION

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls makes almost no mention of the
issues of justice that animated philosophers in earlier centuries. There
is no discussion of justice between persons, issues that Aristotle
sought to explain under the idea of "corrective justice." Nor is there
discussion, except in passing, of punishment, another primary focus of
the social contract approaches of Locke, Rousseau and Kant.' My
aim in this Article is to argue that implicit in Rawls's writing is a
powerful and persuasive account of the normative significance of tort
law and corrective justice.
Tort law is initially puzzling from the point of view of distributive
justice. It protects persons and property against injury and invasion
It focuses on
without regard to the distributions it upholds.
misfortunes that one person brings on another, leaving equally
devastating losses to lie where they fall. Why have an institution
charged with figuring out whose problem it is when things go wrongthat answers its questions not by looking to some idea of distribution,
but instead to norms of conduct governing relations between private
parties, invoking duties and standards of care, questions of
Much contemporary
remoteness, proximity and causation?
scholarship turns this puzzle into conflict: Either tort law must be
made to shift losses on grounds that are at least indirectly sensitive to
concerns about distributive justice, or, as some libertarians would
have it, distributive justice must give way to the rights to person and
property that tort law recognizes. 2 I argue that Rawls offers us the
* Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto. I am grateful to Michael
Blake, Ronald Dworkin, Gregory Keating, Stephen Perry, Ernest Weinrib, and Ben
Zipursky for comments and discussion. Thanks also to Martin Hevia for research
assistance.
1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 3, at 10 (rev. ed. 1999).
2. For examples of the first, see Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and
Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311 (1996), and Hanoch Dagan,
Qualitative Judgments and Social Criticism in Private Law: A Comment on Professor
Keating, 4 Theoretical Inquiries L. 89 (2003). For the second, see Richard A. Epstein,
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basis of an account that enables us to understand the normative
significance of ideas about private wrongdoing and, more importantly,
to locate that significance in relation to the ideas of freedom and
equality that more conspicuously animate A Theory of Justice. I argue
that the key to understanding the relation between distributive and
corrective justice can be found in an idea that Rawls introduces almost
in passing, but which is of the first importance to his project as a
whole.
That is the idea of what he calls "the division of
responsibility"3 between society and the individual.
In focusing on this aspect of his thought, I make no direct use of the
aspect of the theory of justice that has attracted the most attention
among legal scholars, that is, the ideas of the "original position," "veil
of ignorance," and the idea of the social contract that they articulate.
I take Rawls at his word in his claim that these ideas must be
understood primarily as expository devices, and that the contract is, in
Rawls's words, "a device of representation." 4 It does a serious
disservice to Rawls's many contributions to political philosophy to
imagine that he means to be offering anything resembling an
algorithm for determining how society's institutions should work.
Instead, the contract argument is a way of articulating other
arguments concerning the fundamental ideas of freedom and equality.
The division of responsibility is essential to understanding the way the
contract argument articulates those ideas.
In Social Unity and Primary Goods, Rawls introduces the idea of
what he calls "the division of responsibility" between society and the
individual.'
Society as a whole has a responsibility-that is, an
obligation-to see to it that citizens have adequate shares of primary
goods, which they need in order to pursue and revise their own
conceptions of the good life. Distributive shares must be not only
adequate, but also fair. Fairness enters as the necessary condition for
the other dimension of society's share of responsibility: society as a
whole can discharge its responsibility in the sense of its obligation only
if it has given people fair shares. If it has, then private citizens, rather
than society as a whole, are responsible for how things turn out for
them, for whether what Rawls calls their "life plans" succeed or fail.
If society fails to discharge its responsibility, society might still say that
a particular person's failure is his or her own problem, but it lacks the
license to say that it is her responsibility. The other aspect of the
division of responsibility is that each citizen has a special
responsibility for how his or her own life goes. The responsibilities of
private citizens are responsibilities in the same double sense in which
A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973).
3. John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in Utilitarianism and Beyond
159 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) [hereinafter Rawls, Social Unity].
4. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 17 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
5. Rawls, Social Unity, supra note 3, at 159.
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the responsibilities of society as a whole are double: Provided that
society has given them fair shares, private citizens must make what
they will of their own lives, and they alone are accountable for what
they make of these lives.
Rawls presents the idea of the division of responsibility by focusing
only on the relation between society and the individual. Since his
concern is with constitutional essentials, this is an entirely appropriate
focus for him to have. However, that focus may create the misleading
impression that relationships between the individual and the state
exhaust the normative space and significance of Rawlsian liberalism. I
want to suggest that, in order for the idea of each person having a
special responsibility for how his or her own life goes to have content,
we need to understand it in terms of the responsibilities between
private citizens. My concern with responsibility is, again, with the
double sense of that term as it appears on both sides of the Rawlsian
division: In order for each of us to be answerable for what we make
of our own lives, we must also take responsibility-that is, accept
obligations-for the ways that our actions change the life prospects of
others. Conversely, we are responsible, that is, answerable, for the
impact that our deeds have on others. It makes no sense to say that
someone is responsible for what he or she makes of his or her own life
if what becomes of that life depends in the wrong kinds of ways on the
deeds of others, either because he or she is made to bear costs that
properly lie with others, or because he or she is free of costs that are
put onto others. In Political Liberalism, Rawls makes this point when
he speaks of a "division of labor" between the principles governing
the basic structure of society and those governing individual
transactions.6 Rules governing individual transactions see to it that
"individuals and associations are then left free to advance their ends
more effectively within the framework of the basic structure, secure in
the knowledge that elsewhere in the social system the necessary
corrections to preserve background justice are being made."7 Rawls's
example concerns the rules of contract, which govern voluntary
transactions. I will argue that the same line of reasoning requires that
we also conceive of tort law as governing transactions between private
parties, albeit involuntary ones.
I will make these points in the context of a discussion of some
broader issues in Rawlsian liberalism. In Justice as Fairness: A
idea of society that he refers to as
Restatement, Rawls defends an
"property owning democracy." 8 This is an idea that Rawls introduces,
without developing it in great detail. I will argue that it provides a
fundamental part of the Rawlsian picture, indeed, that it is needed in
order to complete that picture successfully. The topic of private
6. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 268 (1993).
7. Id. at 269.
8. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 4, at 138 & nn.
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property in political philosophy has, together with the related topic of
tort liability, fallen into the hands of those whom we might, following
Kant, describe as dogmatists and skeptics. Libertarians are dogmatists
about property-they take ownership rights to be basic and inviolable,
and so view any redistribution as necessarily unjust.' They exclude
distributive concerns by insisting that anything that cannot be deduced
from some axiom of self-ownership is groundless. Contemporary
egalitarians are skeptics, fearing, like Erasmus, that the only way they
can justify their faith in redistribution is by calling any competing
claims into question. Erasmus doubted science, insisting that it was
only a useful way of making predictions to handle mundane matters,
in the hope that he would thereby secure his faith against its
encroachments; 10 contemporary egalitarians doubt the claims of
property, seeing it instead as merely a useful way of creating
incentives to be used by those charged with insuring distributive
justice.
Rawls has been a primary target of both dogmatists and skeptics,
attracting the ire of libertarians such as Nozick, who deny the state
any powers to limit property. For reasons that will become clear in
what follows, libertarians go wrong in supposing that if it is wrong for
one person to do something to another, it must also be wrong for the
state to do that thing.
Rawls has also been criticized by skeptics. G.A. Cohen and Liam
Murphy have each criticized him for what they take to be his excessive
focus on institutions.11 Cohen and Murphy misunderstand Rawls's
project, because they focus only on some of the institutions that are
central to it. As a result, Murphy, in other places, refers to private
property as a "myth" supposing that, on any defensible view of social
justice, it must be nothing more than the plaything of public policies
directed at achieving just outcomes.12
My topic is not property as such, but tort law. Tort law protects
property as well as persons, however, so a Rawlsian account of its
normative structure must take account of property, and explain how it
can merit protection as a matter of justice. Justice requires that
private law-tort, contract, property and unjust enrichment-have a
9. It may be more than a passing coincidence, then, that many contemporary
libertarians adopt a conception of freedom and responsibility that is fundamentally
Leibnizian!
10. See Desiderius Erasmus, De Libero Arbitrio (1524), reprinted in Desiderius
Erasmus, Controversies (Peter Macardle & Clarence H. Miller trans., Charles
Trinkaus ed., 1999); Richard H. Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to
Spinoza 5-8 (1979).
11. See Gerald A. Cohen, If You're An Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?
134-47 (2000); Liam B. Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 251 (1998).
12. See generally Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes
and Justice (2002).
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It is only a certain kind of
certain kind of independence.
independence, since I do not mean to suggest that these private law
regimes cannot, consistently with Rawlsian justice, be limited by the
concerns of public justice. The aggregative effects of contractual
transactions may lead to distributive injustice that needs to be
addressed through public law. Nonetheless, particular transactions
can be judged on their own terms, rather than being subordinated to
distributive justice. 3 The same point applies to property, and to the
involuntary transactions governed by tort law. They too must be
understood in their own terms. A proper understanding of the place
of private ordering, and so, the place of tort law, does not force us into
the Charybdis of libertarianism. Private ordering regulates relations
between private parties, and so need not preclude public limitation.
But if we are to avoid the reef of libertarianism, we must also avoid
being sucked into the idea that relations between private individuals
must be subordinated to distributive concerns. Instead, the Rawlsian
idea of a division of responsibility requires that there be separate
institutions charged with the separate tasks required by that division.
To overlook this division is to make what purports to be a liberal
theory turn out to be illiberal in a way that exactly mirrors the way in
which libertarians are rightfully charged with being illiberal.
Libertarians allow no space for a public sphere because they deny that
the state can have any powers against private citizens that one private
citizen does not already have against another. 4 Egalitarian liberals
make the converse mistake when they suppose that any norms of
conduct governing private parties must be the instrumental delegation
of the powers that the state claims over its citizens," or when they
suppose that self-seeking behavior must be inconsistent with the
broader demands of justice. 6
Rawlsian liberalism provides an alternative to both of these
extreme positions. Rather than trying to generate redistribution out
of ideas of private liberty, or private liberty out of redistributive ideas,
Rawls offers a synoptic vision able to accommodate both. These
themes will remain in the background for most of my Article, but they
will re-emerge at the end, once my discussion of tort law is filled out.

13. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 267.
14. See Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a
Liberal View, 30 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 105 (2001).
15. This view appears to have its origins in the work of Hans Kelsen, but has been
widely influential among those influenced by H.L.A. Hart's legal positivism.
16. I am sure that there are some examples of powers that are merely delegated.
Perhaps the right to make a citizen's arrest is one such example. My point is only to
claim that the ordinary obligations of the citizens-the obligation to respect the
person and property of others, as well as the obligation to repair wrongs one has
committed against others-are not justified by their contribution to the state's
legitimate purpose of providing fair equality of opportunity, or any other legitimate
distributive purpose that the state might be thought to have.

1816

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

I. THE CONTRACT ARGUMENT AND THE DIVISION OF
RESPONSIBILITY

Rawls is probably best known for introducing the idea of a social
contract into contemporary legal and political philosophy. The
contract is supposed to provide a model for the institutional design of
the basic structure of society, by showing that rational persons,
concerned with advancing their own interests, but knowing neither
what the particular content of those interests would be nor what
powers they would have in order to achieve them, would agree to his
two principles of justice-the principle of maximum equal liberty, and
the "difference principle"-so as to best secure their chances of
success in pursuit of their interests. Rawls is explicit that the contract
is an expository device that generates the results that it does because
of the constraints that are built into it. He is also explicit that the
choice, of constraints underlying the contract is itself to be justified not
in terms of any sort of agreement, real or hypothetical, but rather in
terms of a normative conception of the fundamental ideas of freedom
and equality. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls also suggests that the
contract argument might be extended so as to cover all of morality,
leading to an idea that he characterizes as "rightness as fairness." 7
Many scholars have supposed that this suggestion is both the most
important innovation of Rawlsian political philosophy, and also that it
provides the appropriate tools for thinking about a wide variety of
legal problems that Rawls himself never entertains, including not only
the best understandings of the rules of contract law 8 and the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 9 but also my current topic, the
problem of the appropriate tort regime. I want to suggest, however,
that, taken on its own, the contract argument is poorly suited to
understanding the doctrinal details of private law.
I make the argument of this part in two stages. The first stage is
straightforward: as Rawls himself reminds us, the contract argument
itself is merely an expository device, and the specification of the
interests and concerns of the parties cannot be derived from it, but
must instead be brought to it, and defended on independent grounds.
What people would agree to must depend on what they know and
what they care about. Rawls acknowledges this when he writes:
[T]he hypothetical nature of the original position invites the
question: why should we take any interest in it, moral or otherwise?
Recall the answer: the conditions embodied in the description of
this situation are ones that we do in fact accept. Or if we do not,
then we can be persuaded to do so by philosophical considerations
17. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 4, at 15.
18. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and DistributiveJustice, 89 Yale L.J.
472 (1980).
19. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1233 (1967).
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of the sort occasionally introduced. Each aspect of the original
position can be given a supporting explanation.
Those who disagree about doctrinal issues in tort may well find
themselves also disagreeing about the appropriate way to pose the
question of what parties would agree to particularly because, given the
expository nature of the contract device, everyone will be able to see
just where the argument is heading. Defenders of the negligence
standard prominent in tort law will insist that their contractors attach
weight to liberty as well as security, and couch their arguments in
terms of risk; 2' defenders of strict or enterprise liability demand that
their contractors focus on actual injury, rather than the risk of it, and
decide only who should bear the costs. As a device of representation,
the contract may perhaps make these disagreements perspicuous, but
it cannot resolve them.
My second, more serious objection to this strategy is that, for
reasons first pointed out in detail by Thomas Pogge, the contract
argument by its very nature lacks the resources to draw certain
distinctions that are fundamental to an institution such as the law of
tort. 22 The law of tort always asks a highly structured question: Is this
plaintiff entitled to recover from this defendant? If the plaintiff
recovers, she recovers in her own right, for what Cardozo called "a
wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach
of duty to another. '23 That is, she does not recover because she is in
need and her injurer was bad. Nor does she recover so as to advance
some broader set of social purposes. 24 Like the person who seeks
redress for breach of contract, the plaintiff in a tort action must
establish the right kind of relationship between her and her injurer. I
will argue that such relationships must be invisible from the
standpoint through which the Rawlsian social contract is usually
thought to proceed.
II. EXPOSITORY DEVICES AND WHAT THEY EXPOSE
In treating the contract as an expository device, Rawls seeks to
underscore the way in which the argument is part of a more general
strategy of justification. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls characterizes
20. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 87, at 514.
21. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev.

537, 555 (1972).
22. See Thomas Pogge, Three Problems with Contractarian-ConsequentialistWays
of Assessing Social Institutions, 12 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 241 (1995), reprinted in The Just

Society 241 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1995).
23. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
24. I do not mean to deny that a legitimate state can set up institutions to advance
other social purposes. My point is only that there can be no argument of Rawlsian
justice for creating such institutions, the operation of which is triggered by an injury
one person accidentally causes another. I discuss this point in more detail below. See
infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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the broader strategy as "reflective equilibrium," the reconciliation of
our normative commitments to both general principles and particular
considered judgments. Where judgment and principle diverge, one
must give way; through the reflective back and forth of mutual
adjustment, we arrive at principles that are defensible both at the level
of generality at which they are posed, and also at the more specific
level of particularity that they demand when applied to particular
examples. No principle is immune to revision on the grounds that it
leads to unacceptable consequences in a particular case; and no
particular considered judgment is sacrosanct if it is at odds with
general principles with which we find ourselves no choice but to
endorse. In light of this general strategy, it is no surprise that Rawls
construes the parties to the original position as strongly averse to risk.
Those who wish to use the contract argument to yield a result closer to
utilitarianism might point out that people are, as a matter of fact,
variable in their willingness to take on risks, and that, again, as a
general matter, the "maximin" strategy26 that Rawlsian choosers
employ is irrational in most of the contexts of ordinary life. The
strategy of reflective equilibrium provides a ready answer: The
parties are not choosing anything ordinary, and so, their principles of
choice should be guided by their highest-order interest in protecting
their own ability to pursue and revise their own conception of a good.
Again, other critics have suggested that parties in the original position
would choose material equality rather than the difference principle,27
or that they would choose to extend the first principle to include
economic as well as political liberties. Again, Rawls has a ready
answer in terms of reflective equilibrium: Parties in the original
position, concerned with protecting their own ability to pursue their
own conception of the good life, whatever that turns out to be, would
want both as much freedom as possible-hence the first principleand also as many means at their disposal as possible-hence the
difference principle, which allows inequalities where they work to the
benefit of all, that is, where they increase the means that each person
has at his or her disposal.
I regard these Rawlsian rejoinders to the utilitarian, egalitarian, and
libertarian objectors as convincing. I think that Rawls is right to say
that the capacity to set and pursue one's own conception of the good
is a more basic moral concern than the derivative concern with
maximizing one's expected welfare (which yields utilitarianism),
equalizing one's comparative share of resources (which yields
egalitarianism), or minimizing the legal limits on one's range of
25. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 4, at 18.
26. "The Maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst possible
outcomes; we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which is superior to
the worst outcomes of the others." See id. § 26, at 133.
27. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 134-47.
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pursuits (which yields libertarianism). From Rawls's point of view,
each of these interests must be regarded as derivative. But I am not
surprised that his critics have found them unconvincing, because the
thing that ultimately distinguishes Rawlsian liberalism from its
opponents is the conception of a person's higher-order interests with
which it works. The same line of thought has even greater force when
Rawls puts it in the language of constructivism in PoliticalLiberalism.
Constructivism starts with a normative idea of persons as free and
equal, and articulates its conception of justice in light of that idea, so
that the two moral powers of political liberalism, the ability to form a
conception of the good and a capacity for justice, reflect freedom and
equality respectively. 8 Whatever its advantages, however, it is the
point at which the debate with utilitarians, libertarians and their ilk
must be joined, because it is the locus of real disagreement. The
contract argument provides a device to use in representing those
disagreements, but it is not their source. As a result, it is of no real
help in settling that sort of dispute. Rawls provides a detailed
discussion of the sort of reasoning from which parties in the original
position would reach utilitarianism, because "contractarianism" is not
an alternative to utilitarianism at that level. It is a way of thinking
about competing views, and revealing the differences between them.
In the same way, if we hope to use a version of the Rawlsian
contract argument to adjudicate the long-standing dispute (in
American tort doctrine, at any rate) between negligence and strict
liability,29 it seems that we need to resolve the question of the relation
between liberty and security that lies at the heart of that dispute itself.
The problem is deeper, however, because the rationale for the
contract approach in the situation in which Rawls employs itchoosing the basic structure of society-depends upon the allpervasive nature of the choice being made. Rawls offers arguments to
explain both why the basic structure is especially significant, and also
why it forms a self-contained topic for choice from behind the veil of
ignorance. If we are dealing with a topic that is not self-contained in
the requisite sense, parties behind the veil of ignorance might well ask
why it is that they are being asked to make such a choice, or why they

28. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 19.
29. Strict liability is a prominent feature of the American tort landscape,
particularly with respect to products liability. Yet the leading case for understanding
the basis of strict liability turns out to be the nineteenth century English case of
Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), affd sub. nom. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.E.&I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868). Rylands has pretty much lost its steam as a precedent
within the rest of the common law world, including England. See Cambridge Water
Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc., 2 A.C. 264 (H.L. 1993) (Lord Goff, J.); Burnie
Port Auth. v. Gen. Jones Pty Ltd., 179 C.L.R. 520 (H.C. 1994) (Mason, C.J.). More
recently, the House of Lords has concluded that Rylands was a nuisance case, and
that its ruling applies only to uses of land. See Transco Pic v. Stockport Metro.
Borough Council, 2003 WL 22656452 (H.L. Nov. 19, 2003).
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are to be bound by the choice they may have made, given that there
are other factors that might be equally significant to their liberty and
security, factors which must be addressed independently if they are to
decide what the answer will be.
The problem here is not just one about what interests parties
behind the veil of ignorance would have, nor is it a problem about
how they would weigh those interests against each other, whether, for
example, they would attach greater weight to security than to lower
prices for consumer products. If the debate between strict liability
and negligence is a debate about what is fair and just, it must be about
what is fair and just between the parties to the tort action, not about
what is fair and just globally. It must therefore take place within the
context of an idea of private persons having rights as against each
other. For reasons I will now explain, that is a context that the
contract itself cannot generate.
III. THE STRUCTURE'OF TORT LAW
The second problem for anyone who would approach the questions
of tort doctrine through the lens of the contract argument runs
deeper. The difficulty is that the tort doctrine is deontological in its
structure.3 ° One of its central concepts is the concept of duty; another
is the parallel concept of proximity. However we might disagree
about the precise contours of these concepts there is no room for
controversy about their deontological structure: the law of tort draws
a distinction between misfortunes based upon the way in which they
come about. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. reminded us over a
century ago, the law of tort takes no interest in misfortune as such, nor
even an interest in misfortune that is occasioned by the deeds of
others, considered as such.3 1 Neither the law of tort nor its liberal

interpreters imposes or advocates a regime of absolute liability.32
Instead, the law of tort focuses on the relationship between the
parties: Plaintiff's complaint is not that she suffered, nor that
defendant caused her suffering, nor even that her suffering was the
result of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, but rather that her
suffering was wrongful because defendant was not supposed to cause
her injury in that way. This deontological structure cuts across any
disputes between strict liability and negligence. Friends of strict
30. As Peter Glassen and Michael Thompson have each independently pointed
out, strictly speaking, it is dikaialogical rather than deontological, from the Greek
dike for right, rather than deon for duty. See Peter Glassen, The Classes of Moral
Terms, 11 Methodos 223 (1959); Michael Thompson, What Is It to Wrong Someone?
Reason and Value Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz 333, 336 (R.J.
Wallace et al. eds., 2004).
31. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 77 (1881) (Lecture III).
32. See Epstein, supra note 2; Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of General
Strict Liability, 1 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 147 (1988).
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liability may wish to gloss "that way" in terms of foreseeability,33 or of
the risks characteristic of a particular activity in which defendant was
engaged;34 defenders of negligence will talk about the particular risk
imposed by defendant, and the steps that defendant should have taken
to ameliorate them.35 Either way, tort law focuses on what one person
has done to another, on the relation between what defendant has
done and plaintiff has suffered, rather than focusing on either what
defendant has done, or what plaintiff has suffered, considered in
isolation.
This deontological structure of tort doctrine poses an immediate
difficulty for any explication or adjudication of it within the structure
of a Rawlsian contract argument. The problem is that this structure
will always be invisible from the point of view of the contract
argument. Parties behind the veil of ignorance have an interest in
being free of injury, especially bodily injury, and an interest in being
free to engage in activities that have the potential to injure others.
Parallel to these two interests, but distinct from them, is a pair of
interests in receiving compensation if injured, and in spending as little
as possible to compensate others. In addition to these four interests,
parties will also have an interest in avoiding what economists call
transaction costs-they will want to use no more resources than are
necessary to achieve the desired levels of liberty, security,
compensation, and economy. Indeed, as rational choosers concerned
to protect their own means with which to pursue their own purposes,
they must be prepared to forego liberty or security if the price is too
high. It is not clear how the parties could adopt a maximin strategy
with respect to any of these interests, because they are in tension with
each other, and the best outcome with respect to one may be
disastrous with respect to another. Considered in isolation, safety
sounds more important than anything else. But rational beings
concerned with protecting their ability to choose would not give it
unlimited priority if doing so would narrow the range of their choices
too radically.
Thomas Pogge underscores this point by describing the
contractarian approach as "consequentialist," because the contract
argument shares with familiar forms of consequentialism its exclusive
focus on outcomes.36 Indeed, as Pogge points out, in the one place
that Rawls imagines the parties considering a case that Locke,
Rousseau, or Kant might have taken up, that is, the topic of
punishment, he presents them as reasoning in just this sort of way.
33. See Perry, supra note 32.
34. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, A Social Contract Conception of the Tort Law of
Accidents, in Philosophy and the Law of Torts 22 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
35. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 249 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
36. See Pogge, supra note 22.
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Rawls considers the possibility that, were the proliferation of firearms
a sufficiently serious threat to personal security and social stability,
citizens might adopt a regime of strict liability for mere possession of a
firearm. Anyone caught in violation of the prohibition would be
subject to criminal punishment, even though they presumably
intended to do no harm, and perhaps cause no harm and, moreover,
may not have even been aware of their possession of it.3 7 A number
of commentators, notably Thomas Pogge and George Fletcher, have
pointed out that this is among the least satisfactory aspects of Rawls's
argument.38 And it is unsatisfactory for a completely straightforward
reason: The parties are concerned only with outcomes, and, because
they are concerned only with outcomes, must be prepared to trade
liberty off against security in whatever way will best protect their
interests. Rawls treats this example as one of extreme circumstances
in which citizens choose "the lesser of two evils" by abandoning the
idea that the punishment should be conditional on responsibility.39
The difficulty comes with the claim that "the principle of
responsibility... is simply the consequence of regarding a legal
system as an order of public rules addressed to rational persons in
order to regulate their cooperation, and of giving the appropriate
weight to liberty."4 If the idea of responsibility is subordinated to the
contract argument in this way,
it is unsurprising that it should give way
41
in particular circumstances.
The point of this example, and the problem that I want to use it to
draw attention to, is not that it is a reductio ad absurdum of the
contract approach that it yields strict criminal liability. Perhaps such
liability is sometimes defensible. 4 The problem instead is that the
conclusion, palatable or otherwise, seems to be reached in the wrong
way. None of the concerns ordinarily thought to be proper to
questions of just criminal punishmentparticularly issues of
responsibility and fault, but also the related issue of proportionalityis in any way visible in this account, because the contract argument is
centrally concerned with outcomes. To paraphrase the point here in
terms of Bernard Williams's familiar objection to utilitarianism, the
problem with the contract argument is that the parties in the original

37. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 38, at 212-13.
38. See Pogge, supra note 22. I am familiar with George Fletcher's thoughts on
this matter through personal communication I have had with him.
39. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 38, at 213.
40. Id. at 212.
41. I believe that the root of the difficulty here is Rawls's uncharacteristically
hasty acceptance of H.L.A. Hart's account of responsibility in criminal law. Hart's
more general positivism and conventionalism about the rule of law sit uneasily with
Rawls's more Kantian commitment to that idea.
42. See Andrew Simester, Is Strict Liability Really Wrong? (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author).
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position attach value only to states of affairs.43 We could solve this
problem by stipulating that parties in the original position are not
willing to have their freedom compromised by being held to account
for things for which they are not responsible-a reasonable enough
stipulation, actually-but the cost of doing so is parallel to the
problem of attaching infinite disutility to certain types of wrongdoing
on a utilitarian analysis: It deprives the contract argument of its
apparent analytical advantage, and makes it less an expository device
than a format through which conclusions that have been arrived at
independently can be stated.
Parallel difficulties arise if the original position is deployed to deal
with issues of tort. Parties must be concerned to best protect their
interest in being able to pursue (or pursue and revise) their own
conceptions of the good life. From the point of view of that concern,
however, the distinction between harms that I suffer in general and
those harms that are brought about through the wrongdoing of others
is invisible. If I am concerned with protecting my ability to pursue my
own conception of the good, then I am just as concerned about the
ravages of disease and the effects of my own poor judgment as I am
with the effects of wrongdoing by others. I must be indifferent to the
same amount of money whether I need to spend it on first party
insurance or on the implicit "insurance" that a regime of enterprise
liability adds to the prices of consumer goods I might purchase. If I
suffer an injury, such as a gash in my leg, from the point of view of my
ability to pursue and revise my own conception of the good, it does
not matter whether it was broken through your carelessness, through
the risks characteristic of an activity in which you were engaged, or
through my own clumsiness, or by an act of God. Any way you cut it,
the interference is the same, and, it would seem that I would be just as
concerned about being indemnified against my loss, regardless of how
it comes about. The contract argument also has room for the opposite
concern: I presumably have some interest in avoiding liability to
others, since any liability payments I might make deprive me of means
with which I might have been pursuing my own conception of the
good. This countervailing interest cannot be made to do very much
work, if only because it seems that, if we focus only on the domain of
accidental injury, the two competing interests are fully
commensurable: I would want whatever liability regime would lead to
the lowest overall level of cost. On a Rawlsian view, not all costs must
be commensurable: Parties in the original position would perhaps
attach greater priority to safety than convenience.
Yet any priority that is attached to safety is at odds with the familiar
legal distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance. If parties in
43. Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism: For and
Against 82 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973).
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the original position give much higher priority to safety than to the
inconveniences imposed by a concern for the safety of others, it is
difficult to see a basis on which they could attach any weight to the
difference between the failure to take precautions to prevent injury to
others and the failure to take steps of an equal magnitude to aid those
who are in distress. Morally speaking, there may be no basis for
distinguishing easy rescues from the taking of minor precautions-so
much is at stake on one side of the balance, so little on the other.'
The original position captures this moral idea quite nicely, but it does
so in a way that makes its concerns very different from those of tort
law, which denies that there is a civil duty to rescue.
So much the worse for tort law, some might say-perhaps the
correct conclusion is that there should be a tort duty to rescue. The
problem is much more pervasive, however. If appeal to a contract is
supposed to make any contact with tort doctrine, or with ordinary
understandings of its scope, it must have something to say about
accidental damage to property. Parties concerned with security would
also presumably be concerned with protecting whatever property they
had against accidental injury. Having one's home destroyed through
another's action is much less serious than suffering serious injury or
death. Nonetheless, it is still very serious. The contract argument
would seem to require a duty to rescue property as well as persons
when the cost of doing so is small enough in comparison to the
expected loss.
The inability of the contract argument to exclude duties to aid is
only a single example of a much more general problem. The
distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance is more general and
pervasive; if I wrongfully injure somebody else and your interests are
set back as a result-for example, I carelessly destroy the bridge that
connects your island to the mainland, but you do not own that
bridge-you don't recover because I owe you no duty, even though
my wrong caused your injury.45 This is the case even if my
wrongdoing means that your medicine doesn't arrive, and your injury
is serious. If parties in the original position attach greater weight to
security than to the payment of damages, and so would depart from a
strict cost-benefit analysis, then it is difficult to see why no liability
would lie in this case. If the concern that injuries, or at least personal
injuries, must be compensated animates reasoning in the original
position, it will sweep such cases into its net. I do not mean to deny
44. See Joel Feinberg, The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan,
in Freedom and Fulfillment 175 (1992); James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Harv.
L. Rev. 97 (1908-09); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale L.J.
247 (1980). I examine the issue of duties to rescue from the standpoint of the division
of responsibility in Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil, and Criminal, 19 L. & Phil.

751 (2000).
45. See Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267, 269 (N.J. 1945).
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that there could be "extrinsic" reasons, sometimes called reasons of
policy, to limit liability in such cases. My point is only that if they are
extrinsic, they are also extrinsic to the original position.
In talking about the doctrinal structure of tort law, I do not mean to
claim that its doctrinal features are beyond the reach of criticism from
the standpoint of justice. My point is rather that, engaging in the full
exercise of "reflective equilibrium," the direct appeal to what people
would agree to, concerned to advance their interests in both liberty
and security, seems to lead to the wrong normative results. Whatever
we think about the proper application of the distinction between
wronging a person and failing to aid that person, some such distinction
must at least show up in any adequate account of the enforceable
obligations that private citizens owe to each other. So too must the
distinction between wronging one person and wronging another.
Consequentialists are famous in their resistance to such distinctions;
the consequentialist is, after all, the one who has a vendetta against
common sense.46 I take it that one of the hallmarks of Rawlsian
liberalism in general, and the appeal to both Constructivism and the
idea of reflective equilibrium, is that Rawls shares with Kant a certain
kind of philosophical humility.
In rejecting the approach to
justification that he characterizes as "Cartesian," Rawls declines to
cast doubt on the most familiar distinctions of moral life. As Kant
says in The Critique of Practical Reason, he would not take it upon
himself to discover a new moral principle.4 7
The distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance is important
for another reason as well. Unless we have some way of determining
the structure of the obligations between private persons, any attempt
to fix the burdens each of us can be made to bear on behalf of others
will collapse into cost-benefit analysis, even if it is modified to attach
extra weight to bodily safety. The debate between negligence and
strict liability can only be joined if we have the distinction between
nonfeasance and misfeasance in hand. So we need some account of
what it is to owe something to each particular person in order to figure
out what we owe to each other.
I will illustrate this point by considering Gregory Keating's
influential appropriation of Rawlsian social contract theory in his
argument in favor of enterprise liability.48 Keating situates himself
squarely in the Rawlsian tradition when he writes:
The particular justice conception that I am concerned to explicate
has its roots in the social contract tradition; it therefore adopts this
internal perspective in an explicit and self-conscious way. It asks:
46. 1 am grateful to Sergio Tenenbaum for this formulation.
47. See Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason 5:9 (Mary Gregor ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1788).
48. See Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise
Liability, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1266 (1997).
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"What terms would free and equal persons, concerned to cooperate
fairly with each other, agree upon to govern the risks of accidental
injury created by beneficial activities?" This is the basic question of
social contract theory,
4 9 applied to the tort law of accidents, and it is a
question of justice.
Although he does not explicitly employ the device of an original
position, Keating says that issues of justice are to be understood in
Rawlsian contractual terms.5 ° He argues that if we conceive of society
as made up of free and equal moral persons, then we must also
suppose that those persons would attach special priority to their own
safety, so as to protect their ability to pursue their own conception of
the good over a complete life. Keating argues forcefully that if
persons who conceived of themselves in this way were given the
choice between a fault-based regime of negligence for tort law, and a
regime of strict, or enterprise liability, they would opt for the latter, as
it would provide them with greater protection in the event of injury.
Keating notes that parties in the original position are, on Rawls's
account, aware of "general facts about society," and, points out that in
the modern world, one of the most familiar and least disputable facts
about society is that when activities, even ones with very small risks,
are carried out on a large scale, it is inevitable that some accidents will
occur.5 ' Given this information, Keating shows that parties concerned
to protect their security would opt for a system that protected them
against such misfortunes.5 2 Elsewhere, Keating notes the analogy
between such reasoning and the reasoning that leads Rawlsian parties
to the difference principle: Those who benefit least from such
dangerous activities as the transport of gasoline-that is, the small
handful of people who are inevitably injured as a result of the
ineliminable risks attending that activity-will be prepared to accept
the balance of the benefits of modern transport made possible by
gasoline, against the costs, provided that they themselves do not end
up bearing all of the costs.53 Instead, the worst off do as well as they
can, consistent with the interest everyone has in gasoline, if they
receive compensation should they be injured.54
49. Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 193, 196 (2000).
50. "The relevance of Rawls' account of the equal basic liberties is thus not direct,
but general and analogical: The concepts and categories of equal basic liberties
provide an incisive framework for analyzing the problems of accidental injury and
death. Those problems pit two liberties-the freedom of injurers and the security of
victims-against one another." Keating, supra note 2, at 321.
51. Keating draws on Holmes's distinction between "the world of acts" and the
"world of activities." See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected
Legal Papers 167, 183 (Peter Smith ed., 1952) (1920).
52. See Keating, supra note 2.
53. See Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of CostJustification,56 Vand. L. Rev. 653, 679 (2003).
54. Id.
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Keating puts his argument in distinctively Rawlsian terms, speaking
of interests in security, of interests each of us have over a complete
life, and also of the inherently conservative nature of such choices.
Others, less sympathetic to Rawls, have made strikingly similar
arguments. Louis Kaplow and Stephen Shavell, in their book Fairness
Versus Welfare, argue for welfare-maximizing rules in tort and
contract, by considering what parties concerned to advance their
welfare would choose ex ante." In another recent book, Charles Fried
and David Rosenberg apply similar reasoning to the selection of tort
rules.56 These scholars treat the choice of tort regime as a special case
of what Guido Calabresi once called "the decision for accidents," the
decision about how much we, either as a society or as individuals
designing the society in which we will live, are willing to pay for
safety.57 At some point, the priority of safety must give way to the
costs of everything else. Ex ante choice is supposed to enable us to
identify that point.
Keating differs from both of these approaches in important ways.
He focuses on security over a complete life, because he supposes that
the parties are concerned to protect their ability to pursue their own
purposes, rather than their welfare. As a result, the prospect of a
shorter, but happier life cannot be offered to them. He also differs
from them in his explicit recognition that questions about what people
would agree to are always questions of fairness,58 and in his
presentation of the idea of agreement in terms of deliberation.59
Keating's choosers ask, "Which system of liability will best protect
me, consistent with my interest in freedom over a complete life?"
while Kaplow, Shavell, Fried and Rosenberg's choosers ask, "Which
system will benefit me most?"
Despite these differences, Keating's approach shares the difficulties
of the other accounts. It begins with the idea that the something like
ex ante choice behind the veil of ignorance is the appropriate way of
determining which regime we should have for dealing with accidental
injury. Any such approach needs to explain why parties concerned to
protect their freedom would take the topic of accidental injury as the
55. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (2002).
I criticize Kaplow and Shavell's combination of a refusal to engage with tort doctrine
and readiness to suppose that accidental injury by others provides a stable subject
matter for inquiry in Too Much Invested to Quit, 20 Econ. & Phil. (forthcoming 2004)
[hereinafter Ripstein, Too MuCh Invested to Quit].
56. See generally Charles Fried & David Rosenberg, Making Tort Law (2003).
57. Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis
(1970).
58. I demonstrate the difficulties of using arguments about what people would
agree to in attempting to undermine claims of fairness in Ripstein, Too Much Invested
to Quit, supra note 55 (manuscript at 17, on file with author).
59. Keating, supra note 2, at 321 (citing T.M. Scanlon, Jr., The Significance of
Choice, in 8 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 149, 174 (Sterling M. McMurrin
ed., 1988)).
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subject matter of agreement. Someone seeking to explain tort
doctrine might take accidents as their starting point (though to do so
would be to overlook torts ranging from trespass to
misappropriation).'
No such strategy is available for those who
appeal to ideas of agreement to justify a choice of tort rules. The
distributive idea that motivates the presentation of the alternatives as
competing regimes of liability lacks the resources to restrict its
operation to circumstances in which one party injures another. Parties
behind the veil of ignorance or any analogue of it may well be
concerned to protect their security. It is not at all clear why they
would be more concerned to protect their security against accidental
injury occasioned by the activities of others, rather than against
accidental injury more generally, including injuries that they bring
upon themselves. Why would they not choose a scheme of
comprehensive social insurance, or at least a scheme of social
insurance that protected them against disasters, whatever their
source? The only way to distinguish between those misfortunes due
to human choices and those due to nature is to start with an idea of
responsibility, because the social contract cannot generate such an
idea. Parties "choosing" liability rules must strike some balance
between their interest in receiving compensation if injured and their
interest in avoiding excessive premiums incorporated into consumer
prices. The same reasoning applies whether the injuries are natural or
the result of human agency, and whether the cost of providing
compensation takes the form of taxes or of higher prices for consumer
goods.
These points are not new. I have only applied familiar objections to
the context of tort law. As I mentioned, Thomas Pogge has raised the
structural point before, characterizing the indiscriminate use of the
social contract device as indistinguishable from consequentialism.
That is perhaps why it has such surprising and unpalatable results in
the example of punishment. Unlike Pogge, I do not think this
undermines Rawls's own use of the contract, because Rawls uses it to
look to the implications of various competing ways in which a state
could think about its citizens. Rawls shows the implications for
constitutional law of thinking of citizens as free and equal, and as
responsible for their choice of ends. Moreover, with the exception of
the unfortunate discussion of punishment, Rawls makes it clear that
the primary goods sought by parties in the original position are
essential to their ability to pursue and revise their conceptions of the
60. At various points Keating characterizes his account as providing an
interpretation of existing tort doctrine. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 48. It is not
entirely clear how this claim is supposed to be consistent with the idea, also central to
his analysis, that tort gives expression to "natural duties" prohibiting injury to the
person of others. Existing tort practice treats personal injury and property damages
in parallel ways.
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good, thus making his focus on the basic structure principled. Nor do
I accept Pogge's claim that his arguments cast doubt on the idea that
the focus of justice should be on institutions. I believe that Rawls is
right to say that institutions are the starting point for thinking about
justice. The process of identifying the demands of just institutions
must avoid the inevitable difficulties of cost-benefit analysis, and
begin instead, as Rawls himself does, with the idea that individuals are
responsible for their choices.
Indeed, with the exception of the brief discussion of gun control,
Rawls explicitly tells the reader that his account is limited to what he
calls "constitutional essentials."61 It is unsurprising that he limits it in
this way, especially in light of his appeal to Kant, Locke, and
Rousseau. Rousseau raises special problems of interpretation, but
both Kant and Locke are clear that the contractarian aspect of their
argument enters only after the basic structure of rights between
private parties is already in place.62 In the same way, the ideas of
agency and responsibility that animate legal and philosophical
thinking about tort are ideas that we must bring to the contract
argument, because they rest on considerations that cannot be derived
from it. That is why Rawls is explicit that the principles chosen in the
original position are not meant to apply to individual transactions,63
including involuntary ones in which one person injures another.
Individual transactions must be governed by principles of individual
responsibility, not by distributive principles.
As Rawls puts it in Social Unity and Primary Goods, the contract
argument begins with a conception of the person. Part of that
conception, I will now argue, is a conception of a certain kind of
independence and the conception of interpersonal responsibility that
follows from it. That conception supposes that people are not willing
to have their freedom compromised by being held to account for
things for which they are not responsible, and the converse idea that
they are also not willing to have it compromised by being left to bear
burdens for which others are responsible. As I will now show, it must
occupy that place through an argument that is more basic than the
idea of the social contract.
IV. THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY
In Social Unity and Primary Goods, Rawls introduces the idea of a
"division of responsibility" between society and the individual. Rawls
writes:
[Slociety, the citizens as a collective body, accepts responsibility for
maintaining the equal basic liberties and fair equality
61. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 4, § 9, at 28.
62. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 3, at 10.
63. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 265-69.
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responsibility for revising and adjusting their ends and aspirations in
view of the all-purpose means they can expect, given their present
and foreseeable situation. This division of responsibility relies on
the capacity of persons to assume responsibility for their ends and to
moderate the claims they make on their social institutions in
accordance with the use of primary goods. Citizens' claims to
liberties, opportunities, and all-purpose means are made secure from
the unreasonable demands of others. 64
Rawls formulates this idea in terms of the need for individuals to
moderate the claims they make on social institutions: having received
my fair share, it is up to me to make what I will of it, and to make
what I will of my life, using it as my fair share. This is certainly sound
advice, since it reminds us that, on the Rawlsian understanding of
equality and social justice, the concern with distributive shares is
meant to be an expression of an underlying idea of equal freedom,
and that latter idea attaches no independent value to the relative sizes
of different people's holdings. Each of us must moderate the claims
we make on social institutions, because the shares that we have are
ours to do with as we please; it would also be contrary to the freedombased rationale for redistribution if people were then denied the
freedom to do as they please with their shares. It would be contrary
to the idea of equal freedom if a person were entitled to use his or her
share and then demand another.
Each of us has a special
responsibility to make what we will of our own lives inasmuch as it is
up to us to use the shares we would receive as we see fit. It is not up
to any one of us to demand more than our fair share if we come to
regret a choice we have made, nor, conversely, is it up to society to
determine for us what conception of the good our lives should be
organized around. People have their own lives to live, which means
that society has no responsibility for how those lives go, provided that
each has sufficient opportunities and resources.
I want to suggest that this idea of the division of responsibility has a
further dimension to it as well. Rawls draws a distinction between
society and the individual. We might rephrase this distinction as a
distinction between the public and private, noting that some such
distinction is obviously constitutive of liberalism, but at the same time,
allowing for the fact that this precise way in which the distinction is
drawn will be a matter about which reasonable people might disagree
without thereby abandoning their claim to be liberals.
If we think of the realm in which each person is responsible for
what he or she makes of his or her own life, there is some temptation
to suppose that our special responsibility is a responsibility that each
of us has, as against the state, which has the other responsibility for
64. Rawls, Social Unity, supra note 3, at 170.
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seeing to it that we have adequate resources and liberties to do so. To
view the division of responsibility in this way is to model the special
responsibility that each person has for his or her own life on the sort
of special relation to God and one's own salvation that figures in some
Protestant understandings of religion. This way of framing the special
responsibility treats it as a generalization of the idea of freedom of
religion. Something like this idea arguably underlies John Locke's
argument in A Letter Concerning Toleration" in which he argues that
the state has no business interfering with religious matters, because
religion is a matter of achieving salvation, concerning only the
individual believer and God. However influential this view may have
been in the formative period of liberal thought, it does not seem to me
to be a promising, let alone compelling, model for the idea that Rawls
is putting forward. The responsibilities of society as a whole, acting
through the state, are responsibilities to enable people to make what
they will of their own lives, providing them, among other things, with
a fair share of resources to use in pursuit of their chosen conception of
the good. Citizens are not left with the space within which to decide
what matters to them most, or even a space in which to express what
matters to them most, but rather, they are provided with both the
space and resources, that they can use to decide on and carry out a
plan of life.
A better way of thinking about the special responsibility that each
of us is said to have for how our own life goes begins with the thought
that, although the private realm is private in the sense that it contrasts
with the public realm of communal decision making and provision,
there is another sense in which the private realm is inescapably public,
because each of us does not engage in our private task of self-creation
in the absence of or abstraction from others. Indeed, often the only
way to realize a conception of the good is to do things with otherslifting something too heavy for one person to carry, building a
building, or having and raising children are all things that private
persons must do together if they do them at all. But even when one is
engaged in a quintessentially private pursuit, tending one's own
garden, there is a sense in which the activity is also essentially public.
As I engage in my activity, and you engage in yours, if each of us has a
special responsibility for what comes of our respective pursuits, the
separateness of those pursuits must be reconciled in a way that
preserves their independence.66
65. (James H. Tully ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1983) (1689).
66. This way of conceiving of the division of responsibility has the further
advantage of providing a principled response to Pogge's objection that the contract
argument is consequentialist, and to Ronald Dworkin's argument that Rawls's
difference principle, with its focus on the worst off, without any attention to how they
became worst off, has no room for ideas of individual responsibility. See Ronald
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 113-18 (2000).
Rawls's focus on the expectation of the worst off presupposes a structure of
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If we think of the private realm as essentially public in this way, it
becomes immediately clear why something with the broad doctrinal
structure of tort law would be required by the division of
responsibility. Each of us has a special responsibility for how his or
her own life goes; that responsibility can only be understood in terms
of each of us being free to set and pursue our own plan of life in a way
that is consistent with others being able to do the same, all of which
must take place within the limits set by the just basic structure,
including both political and civil liberties and such economic
redistribution as is necessary. We do not each want as much freedom
as possible, if that is conceived in abstraction from the requirements
of a just basic structure; we each would want, instead, as much
freedom to set and pursue our own conception of the good as we can
have in a way that is consistent with others having the same. Now
having the basic civil liberties, such as freedom of expression and
freedom of thought, built in as constitutional essentials is one aspect
of the interest that we have in that liberty. But it is only one aspect,
because we do not merely wish to be able to conceive our conceptions
of the good. Nor do we merely wish to be able to discuss those
conceptions. Without minimizing the importance of freedom of
thought and discussion, from the point of view of agents concerned
with their ability to set and pursue their conception of the good, these
things must not be the end of the story. We need to be able to
actually pursue whatever life plan we choose. Having a fair share of
resources is important. But so too is the respect in which we have
those resources, and indeed, the sense in which we have the other
"resources" important to setting and pursuing a conception of the
good, namely our own bodily powers. My use of those bodily powers
is, once again, subject to the demands of justice, and so my claim over
them does not entitle me to refuse to yield up some of their fruits
towards the needs of others, via the tax system. For that matter, it
does not even entitle me to refuse to yield them to some pressing
public purpose-perhaps I can be pressed into service to build a dike
to prevent a flood, or even to fight a war against an enemy invader.
All of this falls under the public side of the division of responsibility;
society can demand that I do my fair share, just as I can demand that I
receive my fair share from society. Moreover, both the individual and
the society can make these demands on an ongoing basis. I do not
receive my fair share only once, or discharge all of my obligations to
society through a single payment.
What my claim to my bodily powers (and property) does entail, is
that once these fair public arrangements are in place, no other
interaction in which what happens to a particular person depends on that person's
choices. Those who decide not to develop their talents are not entitled to a set welfare
or income floor, but to a social structure in which they can make what they choose to
of their abilities and fair shares.

2004]

THE LAW OF TORT

1833

individual has any claim on my person or resources, unless I have
somehow undertaken to give him or her such a claim. Absent
contractual arrangements, or some peculiar set of private
arrangements deemed by law, such as those between parents and
children, others can make no demands on my person or property.
Conversely, I can make no demands on theirs. To allow me to make
further demands on others-to allow me, for example, to injure them,
or damage their goods as I go about my pursuit of my own plan of
life-would be inconsistent with the idea that each of us has a special
responsibility for his or her own life, because it would allow me to
displace the costs of my own pursuit of my own plan of life on to
others. I also cannot make further demands on others by using what
is theirs in pursuit of purposes that they do not share, borrowing their
property without their consent, or tricking them into doing something
on my behalf. In the same way, to allow others to make further
demands on me would saddle me with the responsibility for how well
those other people find that their lives go.
The division of responsibility thus requires an account of the sense
in which we have what is our own. My share of primary goods must
be mine, in the sense that it is at my disposal to use in setting and
pursuing my own conception of the good. But I don't have those
things at all if others can subordinate them to their pursuit df their
own conceptions of the good, either by damaging them as a byproduct of their pursuit of their purposes or by using them without my
consent. If someone wrongs me in the first of these ways, they
interfere with my ability to take responsibility for my own life in a
familiar way, because they deprive me of the means I had to do so.
The person who wrongs me in the second way, by using what is
mine- that is, my person or property-without my consent violates
my special responsibility in a different way, by making use of powers
or goods that are mine in pursuit of something that is not part of my
conception of the good. In so doing, such a person both advances his
or her own conception of the good with more than his or her just
share of resources and also violates my freedom by subordinating my
power to decide which purposes to advance. I am pressed into service
in pursuing a conception of the good that I do not accept.
The division of responsibility thus requires that I have what is mine
as against all others, where the phrase "all others" is understood
severally rather than jointly. Each person owes each other person
duties of forbearance, duties to avoid using or damaging what belongs
to another. At the same time, the other, public side of the division of
responsibility provides the space within which the private part makes
sense, so there is no objection to requiring people to do things, or
surrender goods, for public purposes.
The idea that a liberal vision that allows for redistribution must
allow people to have what is their own, and to use it as they see fit
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may seem puzzling, if we suppose that the underlying motivation for
the Rawlsian project is to find a way to divide up a pot of common
goods on which nobody has any prior claim. Although Rawls does
discuss how goods can be justly divided, the underlying motivation for
setting the problem is much more Kantian than that description would
suggest. Distributive shares are important because they enable
choice. Rawls's formulation in A Theory of Justice is often read as
resting on the empirical claim that people want as much as possible,
and just as often criticized for assuming that people have exclusively
or excessively individualistic and possessive conceptions of the good.67
In Political Liberalism, Rawls preempts this misunderstanding by
formulating the idea of primary goods in the language of
constructivism. Primary goods are not the things that selfish people
expect they will want prior to knowing the specific ways in which they
are selfish. Instead, they are the things wanted by parties concerned
to protect their own ability to decide for themselves how to live their
lives. Like Kant, Rawls recognizes that to choose something, rather
than merely wish for it, I must take myself to be in a position to act in
pursuit of it.6" Parties in the original position want income and wealth
so that they are free to choose. 69

As such, they must have what is

theirs in a way that enables them to choose, rather than subjecting
them to the choices of others.
Thinking of my powers as enabling me to make choices does not
depend on any idea about unencumbered or disembodied selves
making choices in abstraction from everything. To the contrary, my
body is that through which I act, and my bodily powers determine
what I am able to do in pursuit of my own conception of the good. As
we have seen, talk about a "conception of the good" has the potential
to create the impression that all I need to do is conceive of my good.
But my claim to my bodily powers in particular is my claim to be able
to do things, to choose them rather than just wish for them, and to do
so, as Rawls puts it, "over a complete life."7"
67. See the discussion of this issue in Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and
Liberal Neutrality, 99 Ethics 883 (1989).
68. This point is explicit in Kant. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
3 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge U. Press 1996) (1797).
69. This way of understanding the significance of primary goods underwrites the
assumption that parties in the original position do not know their own conception of
the good. Their interest in freedom demands that they choose their own conception of
the good, so as to enable themselves to do so. The idea of freedom precludes the
possibility that a person's conception of the good is simply a brute fact about them.
As Rawls puts it in Social Unity and Primary Goods, "the use of primary goods,
however, relies on a capacity to assume responsibility for our ends." See Rawls, Social
Unity, supra note 3, at 169. He makes the same point when he describes means as
necessary to the "the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue ... a
conception of what we regard for us as a worthwhile human life." See Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 6, at 302.
70. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 335.
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The difference principle applies to the structure governing the
results of social cooperation, and as such limits my claims on the fruits

of my powers, and the use of my property.

In correcting for the

aggregate effects of legitimate private pursuits the difference principle
does not presuppose any ideas about property being merely
conventional or serving as a tool to promote appropriate
distributions.7 1
Understanding primary goods in this way enables the Rawlsian to
provide a principled answer to both the libertarian dogmatist and the
egalitarian skeptic. The libertarian dogmatist falls prey to Rawls's

argument that we cannot attach sense to questions about what a
person deserves, or what a person has produced, unless we have
already determined fair distributive shares.
So the libertarian

dogmatist cannot talk about who is entitled to what in terms of what
people have produced, without an independent account of what
people are entitled to do with, or keep, of what is theirs. The
dogmatist
confuses principles
governing particular private

transactions with ones governing the other side of the division of

responsibility. 72 My entitlement to my share of primary goods flows
from principles of justice in distribution; so too does any entitlement I
have to the fruits of my share of goods.
The egalitarian skeptic insists that ideas of tort and property are
merely matters of positive law that raise no issue of justice, and so are
to be decided at a later, legislative stage. He may hope to take
comfort in Rawls's response to the libertarian dogmatist. But the
71. Critics of private property sometimes point to the "bundle" analysis of
property introduced by Hohfeld, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal
Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 719 (1917), and made
prominent by Tony Honord, see A.M. Honord, Ownership, in Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). Its strengths as an analysis of the concept
of property remain controversial. See, e.g., J.W. Harris, Property and Justice (1996);
James Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (1996). Whatever its merits, however, it
is of no help in addressing issues of the appropriate normative conception of property.
The rights that individuals have to their person and powers can also be represented as
a bundle, but few who claim a concern with justice would want to conclude that
individual rights against personal injury and exploitation are merely tools to be used
in pursuit of some socially desirable outcome. The state does have the power to limit
freedom of the person, not only through taxation and the criminal law, but also
through quarantine in the case of an epidemic. But the legitimacy of quarantine does
not show that the justification of the right to security of the person is instrumental. In
the case of property, Hohfeld's own analysis confirms this point. See Hohfeld, supra,
at 719. It starts from the idea that property is a matter of relations between persons
with respect to things, and the related idea that a single person can stand in different
relations to different persons with respect to the same thing. Thus it does not exclude
the idea being explored here, according to which the justification of property rights
against other citizens does not preclude a public power to tax property or regulate its
uses. Conversely, the public power to regulate or tax does not preclude private rights.
72. At the level of doctrinal detail, most libertarians appear to misconstrue the
principles governing private transactions as well, favoring a causation-based account
of strict liability. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2.
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response to the libertarian dogmatist also defeats the skeptic. The
root of the libertarian dogmatist's confusion is an illicit inference from
the perfectly sound idea that it would be inconsistent with my freedom
to set and pursue my own conception of the good to allow any other
private person to force me to pursue his or her own purposes, by
depriving me of what is rightfully mine, to the very different, and
unsound idea that what is rightfully mine does not depend upon more
general claims of justice, so that if no private party can take my
property for his or her own purpose, then the state cannot tax me for
its purposes. The egalitarian skeptic sees that the conclusion of the
inference is false, and so concludes that the premise must also be false,
and so insists that property rights, and private obligations more
generally, must be mere instruments in pursuit of some distributive
goal. The Rawlsian liberal is the one who sees that although the
dogmatist's conclusion is false, its falsity does nothing to impugn the
premise, because the premise does not entail the conclusion. That just
is the division of responsibility: Different rules regulate the justice of
the basic structure and the justice of individual transactions, both
voluntary and involuntary.
Moreover, when it comes to tort law, the Rawlsian does not need to
accept the Lockean picture of the relation between rights to the
person and rights to property that animates dogmatists and skeptics
alike. The law of tort treats persons and property in parallel fashion,
despite the obvious differences between them. There are both
trespasses against the person and trespasses against property, as well
as injuries to both person and property, and the set of obligations
governing each are strikingly similar. The dogmatist celebrates this
parallel, imagining it to show that property just is an extension of
personhood. The skeptic is more likely to be embarrassed by it, if
only because the claim that property rights are merely conventional
and instrumental is so much easier to advance than the parallel claim
that rights to personal security is. If both are in the service of
egalitarian aims, why do they receive the same protection? (Of
course, the egalitarian might say that they should not.) Again, the
Rawlsian answer is that as between private parties, the division of
responsibility mandates that we treat each person as free to do as he
or she sees fit with the means at his or her disposal, that is, to use both
bodily powers and income and wealth in pursuit of his or her own
conception of the good, in a way consistent with others having the
same freedom to pursue their conception of the good. All of this is
done within a broader framework of redistributive institutions, the
other half of the division of responsibility. Personal powers and
property are alike in their significance to the claims of other private
parties, and so subject to parallel treatment in tort.
To sum up, parties choose principles governing the distribution of
primary goods because they are concerned with their ability to set and
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pursue their own conception of the good. They do not ask what each
of them is prepared to do for all the others; they ask what coercive
structures they should select so that each may have freedom to pursue
his or her own conception of the good in a way that is consistent with
everyone else being able to do the same. But they can only ask that if
they have entitlements to use their shares, whatever they are, in
pursuit of their own conceptions of the good, that is, without needing
to subordinate those pursuits to the particular pursuits of others, to do
so would be to give up on the idea of independence.73
V. TORT AND CONTRACT
I want to highlight the structure of the argument so far by focusing
on the example that Rawls considers of the institutional significance
of the division of responsibility. In Political Liberalism, Rawls notes
that there is a division of labor between two kinds of rules, those of
distribution and those of transfer. 74 This division of labor follows from
the division of responsibility. His example of the latter sort of rule is
the law of contract. We can see why it is required by the idea of each
person's responsibility for his or her own life. My interest in having
both my own powers and my own fair share of primary goods is an
interest in having those things at my disposal, that is, to have them
available to me, so as to pursue and revise my own conception of the
good.
Rawls describes primary goods as "all-purpose means"
precisely because they are things that may be used in pursuit of a wide
variety of purposes, and that make it possible for me to take up
various particular purposes. 75 But one of the most important ways in
which I will be able to pursue my own conception of the good is by
entering into private arrangements with other people, including the
joint pursuit of common ends and economic transactions that enable
each of us to pursue our own separate ends in a way that is to the
advantage of both. I can only do such things provided that I am able
to give what is mine to another person, either by giving them my
73. What of the possibility of something like the system of social insurance for
accidents that briefly replaced tort in New Zealand? The arguments that led to its
adoption are all at odds with the Rawlsian view under consideration here. See P.S.
Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law (1970); P.S. Atiyah, The Damages
Lottery (1997). I examine these in Some Recent Obituaries of Tort Law, 48 U.
Toronto L.J. 561 (1998). Nonetheless, we can imagine a society legitimately deciding
to require that everyone carry liability insurance, and, for administrative reasons,
dispensing with any requirement of proof of negligence. If such a system were
operated by the state, it would approximate such a system. What would be
unacceptable from the point of view of Rawlsian justice, however, is a system that
displaced private rights in favor of a standardized schedule of payments.
74. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 268-69.
75. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 93 (1971). Rawls abandons this vocabulary
in later writings, but only because he worries that it appears to be psychological in a
way that it is not meant to be. Preface to the French Edition of A Theory of Justice,
reprinted in Rawls Collected Papers 417 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
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goods or by performing services for them. If I and those with whom I
enter into arrangements are separate persons, with separate purposes
and, more to the immediate point, separate schedules, then one of the
primary ways in which we could enter into mutually advantageous
transactions is by each of us being able to transfer our entitlements to
things-both goods and services-separately from the actual delivery
of those things. The ability to subordinate our share of our primary
goods to our own private conceptions of the good thus requires that
we be able to enter into forward contracts. Moreover, it requires that
those contracts be enforceable, just in the sense that the law must
deem the obligation to transfer to have taken effect at the moment of
contract formation. If I promise to cut your lawn next Wednesday, I
thereby give you the right to have me cut your lawn. If I fail to do so
at the specified time, you still have the right that I do so, and so are
entitled either to performance or to damages in lieu of performance.
The power to enter into contracts makes distributive shares
valuable to people in pursuing their own conceptions of the good.
The power to have those contracts enforced does not merely provide
an incentive to compliance. More significantly, it makes voluntary
exchanges possible, by enabling people who exchange things to get
what they bargained for, in the sense of what they expected when they
entered into those arrangements.
Matters are no doubt much more complicated than this initial
sketch suggests:
there surely are some powers that cannot be
transferred, and there are limits on the contexts within which such a
transfer is binding (although one would hope that the fair distribution
of primary goods in the society would do much to see to it that those
limits were generally satisfied). Nonetheless, the point of the example
is to illustrate the more general ways in which the division of
responsibility presupposes some idea of private ordering. The sketch
also suggests that we do not need to ask whether this set of
enforceable institutions would be acceptable to parties in the original
position. Unless we assume some such set of arrangements, it is
difficult to see why parties in the original position would be interested
in their shares of primary goods at all. Absent the power to transfer,
including the power to transfer in advance, through promise, the
distributive shares would own the people as much as the people
owned the distributive shares.7 6
None of this is inconsistent with the idea Rawls defends in Political
Liberalism, according to which the aggregate effects of individual
transactions may lead to injustices in holdings that need to be
addressed. The point is simply that the need to address those

76. Kant, supra note 68, at 125-38. Discussing perpetuities, Kant notes that their
result would be that the land inherited the people instead of vice-versa. See id.
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inequalities in no way undermines the importance of particular
transactions to the relation between primary goods and freedom.
Contract is necessary to the ability to use distributive shares
because it governs voluntary transactions. Tort is just as important
because it governs involuntary transactions, that is, those transactions
in which one person suffers a loss (or is used for gain) at the hands of
another. If what is mine is not subject to my choice, but to yourswhich happens when you use what is mine without my consent-or
vulnerable to the effects of your choice-which happens when you
injure me or my goods-then it is not mine to use in setting and
pursuing my own conception of the good.
By focusing on tort and contract this way, I have attributed to
Rawls a broadly Kantian understanding of the nature of private rights.
To do so seems to me to be the best way of understanding his
commitment to constructivism, as well as the way in which parties in
the original position are concerned to maximize their expected shares
of primary goods, rather than, for example, welfare. The Kantian
conception has a further advantage as well, in that it is congruent with
Rawls's focus, especially in Political Liberalism, on the idea of the
centrality of the coercive structure to fundamental issues of justice.
Like Rawls, Kant sees the fundamental question of political
philosophy to be one about the legitimate use of coercion, rather than
seeing it as primarily about moral obligations, which may be enforced
coercively when it is effective to do so. By focusing on the idea of
freedom, and what it is to interfere with the freedom of another, we
get an account of tort law that is concerned with the basis and limits of
enforceable obligations. Rawls does not need to say that there is a
moral obligation to repair the wrongful injuries I cause, and that at
some later, legislative stage, the state decides whether to enforce it.
Instead, he can say that when private citizens have their rightful
shares of primary goods, anyone who violates their private rights
wrongfully interferes with their freedom, and so the aggrieved party
has an enforceable entitlement to be put back into the situation he or
she was in."
VI. NONFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE
We are now in a position to restore the distinction between
nonfeasance and misfeasance to its proper place. When choosing, free
and equal persons are interested in their distributive shares because
they want to be able to do things with them; they can only be
interested in shares of primary goods if they have them in the
requisite sense.7" That sense of having is prior to any considerations
77. I develop these Kantian themes in more detail in Authority & Coercion, 32
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 2 (2004) [hereinafter Ripstein, Authority & Coercion].
78. The situation thus contrasts with that of parties we might imagine choosing a
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about what parties would agree to, because there is no basis for
agreement unless people already know what it is to have things as
their own, as against all others. I only have things as my own to use in
forming, pursuing and revising my conception of the good inasmuch
others are under an obligation to avoid interfering with them. So they
must be under an obligation to avoid using or injuring my person or
property. As private parties, they cannot be under any corresponding
obligation to confer any benefit on me, no matter how significant the
benefit, and no matter how easy it is to confer. Such an obligation
would undermine the sense in which what they have is their own.
That is just the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance.
This brings us back to the law of tort. Almost anything I do will
have some effects on other people. The way in which I pursue my
own conception of the good may lead me to take up opportunities
that, as a result, will no longer be available to others, whether by
acquiring things that others might have wanted to pursue their
purposes, by entering into various arrangements, personal and
otherwise, with others that preclude some other person from entering
into the same relation with the same person, and by exercising choices
in a way that makes some popular things more expensive for others.
All of these effects that one person might have on another are
consistent with each of us having a special responsibility for how our
own life goes, because they are simply the inevitable side effects of
separate persons making separate decisions in the presence of others.
But there are other ways in which we have effects on others that are
different. If I use what is yours without your consent, then I
subordinate your pursuit of your purposes to my pursuit of mine. If I
injure you, or damage your goods, I prevent you from using your
powers to set and pursue your own conception of the good. So while
the former class of side effects must simply be accepted79 as inevitable,
the latter set is inconsistent with each of us having a special
responsibility for our own life. However, to say that they are
inconsistent is not to say that they will never happen, and here too, the
division of responsibility sheds considerable light on the doctrinal
structure of tort law. If I wrongfully injure you, I am liable to you in
damages, just because the payment of damages aims to "make you
whole," that is, to restore to you, as much as it is possible to do so,
means equivalent to those of yours that I have injured. To put you
back in the same place is to put you back in the same place with
distribution of welfare. Welfare (if there is such a thing that can be distributed) must
be a final end, so that there is no further question of what parties will do with it.
Primary goods can only be wanted if we know how we are allowed to use them. This
point has been lost on many readers of Rawls, perhaps because they have been misled
by his generosity in attributing the idea of an original position to Harsanyi into the
conclusion that the parties in the original position simply want as much as possible
without knowing what they might be entitled to do with their shares.
79. See Bolton v. Stone, [1951] App. Cas. 850 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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respect to your ability to set and pursue your own conception of the
good.
It is worth noting that on this understanding of the division of
responsibility, the payment of damages does not serve to restore a
previous distribution that is judged to be just on the basis of, for
example, the difference principle. The pattern of holdings in society
will change whenever one person wrongs another, and, when damages
are set out to make up that wrong, to right it, the pattern of holdings
will change yet again, but they will not be returned to the pattern
before the wrong took place. If I injure you through my carelessness,
for example, you will end up with less at your disposal. If I am
compelled to repair the wrong, so that you are restored to the
situation in which you are in a position to decide what to make of your
life, I will end up in a worse position than I was in beforehand. But
this is just what we should expect from the point of view of the
division of responsibility, because my ending up worse off is a
consequence of my own special responsibility for how my own life
goes. It is as though I had injured myself, or damaged my own
property. Of course, I end up with less than I would have had there
been no such injury, but, because I have a special responsibility for
how my own life goes (but not for how your life goes, nor you for
mine) it is consistent with that responsibility that, through my
voluntary conduct, should I behave carelessly, I bear the costs of that
carelessness. The person who uses what is mine without my consent,
either by borrowing my property, or duping me into doing something
for her, can also be made to repair any loss I suffered, or alternatively
to surrender any gain she has acquired, because I must be the one who
decides the purposes for which my goods will be used. 8"
The division of responsibility also solves the other problem that
The
approach.
contractarian/consequentialist
faced
the
80. For the same reason, the law of damages is not simply a matter of enforcing a
prior moral obligation to avoid injury to others. People do owe each other such
natural moral duties, but to suppose that the law does simply give effect to them is to
make a mistake parallel to that of supposing that the difference principle is
enforceable in a just society as a way of giving effect to a natural duty of charity to
those in need. In each case, the confusion comes from rejecting the Rawlsian insight
that justice is distinctive because claims of justice are enforceable as reciprocal limits
of human freedom. The use of force is consistent with freedom only when it is part of
a set of reciprocal limits on freedom. In the case of the difference principle, ignoring
this aspect of Rawlsian justice leads to objections about the limited causal impact of
the coercive structure when compared with other aspects of social life. See, e.g.,
Cohen, supra note 11, at 134-47. In the case of the law of tort, ignoring this aspect of
justice leads to the confusion of the idea of one person wronging another with that of
one person behaving badly, and so to familiar "moral luck" objections to tort liability.
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 387 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). In each case,
the objection regards coercion as an instrument for inducing virtuous behavior, rather
than in light of its relationship to freedom. I examine these issues in more detail in
Ripstein, Authority & Coercion, supra note 77.
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contractarian/consequentialist approach had no room for the
distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, because it seemed
to focus all of the attention on how much of a burden one person may
be required to bear for the sake of another. But that question must
be, both as a matter of common sense morality and as a matter of tort
doctrine, a question that only comes up secondarily, that is, a question
that only comes up when we have already established that one person
owes another a duty to look out for some interest or other. The
division of responsibility tells us that as private citizens, we must look
out for the interests in person and property of others; as such, it does
not tell us exactly how much we should do with respect to those
interests. But without the division of responsibility, if we look only at
how much one person's interest burdens the freedom of another, it
seems that the only answer can be the sort of aggregative one that we
saw above.
With the division of responsibility in place, we still have a question
left about how much care one person can demand of another. The
answer, both legal and Rawlsian, must of course be "reasonable" care.
Reasonable persons, Rawls tells us in Political Liberalism, "are not
moved by the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social
world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on
terms all can accept."8 How much care is reasonable is fixed by
asking what is consistent with the interests that all have in liberty and
security.12 But we can only get to that question once we have already
demarcated the boundaries of duty, as the division of responsibility
enables us to.
It is perhaps worth mentioning that a further advantage of thinking
about the law of tort in terms of the division of responsibility is that it
gives a ready answer to the question of whether, why, and most of all,
when we should take an interest in the effects that one person's deeds
have upon another. The Rawlsian answer is that we take such an
interest in circumstances in which we are more or less satisfied with
the justice of the background circumstances against which they
interact. Where those background circumstances are not just, we still
have no difficulty in saying just who did what to whom-I broke your
vase, you broke your promise, and so on-but we may wonder about
the wisdom of enforcing any of the rights that are so violated. The
division of responsibility enables us to articulate the reason: The
special responsibility that each of us has for how our own life goes is a
responsibility that we can only be held to in conditions of justice; we
cannot hold somebody liable in damages except as a way of
recognizing that person's special responsibility for his or her own life,

81. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 50.
82. I develop this Rawlsian account of the reasonable in the law of negligence in
my Equality, Responsibility, and the Law ch. 1-4 (1999).
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in the context of a plurality of separate persons with separate
purposes.
VII. "NON-IDEAL THEORY"

The Rawlsian account of tort law I have outlined gets its normative
impetus from the background justice of the society as a whole. If a
society is unjust in its liberties and opportunities, or in the distribution
of primary goods, we must work with what Rawls calls "non-ideal
theory. '"83
There is an interesting and difficult question about
whether, or to what extent, private rights are legitimately enforceable
where background justice is not satisfied. I can only gesture at the
beginnings of an answer here. If private holdings are inconsistent with
justice, there are bound to be misgivings about treating those holdings
as enforceable. At the same time, it is far from clear that those
misgivings generate an entitlement for private parties to disregard the
safety of others with impunity. Certainly few would wish to argue that
because disparities in wealth are so great in modern societies, wealthy
people should be free to disregard the person and property of poor
people. We might further doubt whether any particular person can
rightly appeal to the overall structure of society as a whole in response
to a tort action, if only because those who are in the best position to
raise such an issue will be the very people who are too poor to be sued
anyway.
The problem here is a special case of a much more general kindthe claim to enforceable rights, including enforceable private rights,
depends on the existence of a largely just basic structure. Where the
basic structure is entirely unjust, Rawlsian theory may well say that
there are no enforceable rights at all." Where the structure is largely
just, but not entirely so, Rawlsian theory must be silent about how to
classify particular cases.
Even if the lack of a sufficiently just basic structure raises questions
about the extent to which the division of responsibility can justify
existing tort practice, that division does enable us to understand the
kind of justice to which tort law must aspire if it is to be consistent
with the ideas of freedom and equality at the root of the Rawlsian
conception of justice. The law of tort rightly concerns itself only with
discrete transactions involving two private parties; its claim to do so as
a matter of justice must be understood as a claim to be doing justice
between those parties, because, as between the two of them, neither
has a claim on the powers or resources of the other. On this
understanding, tort doctrine is only secondarily about who pays; the
primary focus is on how people are allowed to treat each other.
83. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, §39, at 216.
84. See Kant, supra note 68, at 8 41.
85. Talk about each person having a special responsibility for his or her own life
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CONCLUSION

The division of responsibility animates Rawls's use of the social

contract in a way that avoids the objection that he is engaged in
merely consequentialist reasoning. The parties in the original position
are not simply out to advance their purposes; they are concerned to
protect their ability to take responsibility for their choices as they set,
pursue, and revise their own conceptions of the good. The ability to
do so, consistent with the equal freedom of others, requires a just

constitutional structure, specifying their rights against society as a
whole, and adequate shares of other primary goods, including income
and wealth. It thus provides a powerful account of distributive justice.
I have argued that it also provides a powerful account of corrective

justice, one that explains why it is neither the master nor the servant
of distributive concerns. Each person has a special responsibility for

his or her own life, not only as against the state, but also as against any
other private party. This idea of independence explains the place in
Rawlsian doctrine for relational ideas of duty, proximity, and

causation in ordering relationships between private parties. Our
separate pursuits must be rendered consistent if each of us is to be
responsible for what we make of our own lives.

may seem artificial, when measured against the actual practices of tort litigation. Like
the medieval and early modern fact patterns that are the stuff of the torts classroomseparating fighting dogs with a stick, carelessly helping a passenger onto a departing
train, runaway horses and safe harbors in a storm-the analysis offered here may
seem to overlook the ways in which money determines which precautions people
take, and who makes it to court, both in the form of expensive procedure and in the
form of defendants who are "judgment proof." Again, the defendant in most tort
litigation is not some private party making his or her own way in the world, but rather
some large corporation, that produced a dangerous or harmful product. Since tort
liability does not typically make a significant difference to defendant's ability to make
his, her, or its way in the world, it might be thought that it makes no real contact with
the division of responsibility. Far from being irrelevant, the division of responsibility
provides the lens through which we can articulate the precise nature and dimensions
of the problem. Massive inequalities of wealth and power threaten the ability of
private parties to take responsibility for their own lives, free from the interferences of
others. That is why redistributive institutions are necessary: to protect independence,
even if the threat to it arises through the aggregative effects of particular transactions,
none of which is objectionable in its own right.

